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No-Poach, No Precedent: How DOJ’s
Aggressive Stance on Criminalizing Labor
Market Agreements Runs Counter to
Antitrust Jurisprudence
Noelle Mack*

I. INTRODUCTION
When non-law-abiding citizens wonder whether their conduct is
subject to criminal penalties, most turn to state and federal criminal
statutes for guidance. Under antitrust law, potential wrongdoers must look
to the Sherman Act – a broad “charter of freedom” requiring an unusual
level of interpretation by federal courts.1 Reflecting Congress’ belief that
“competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market,”2
the Sherman Act simply outlaws “every contract, combination, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce.”3 The drafters of the
Sherman Act could have delineated specific categories of proscribed
conduct such as bid-rigging, price-fixing, or entering into no-poach
agreements, yet the Act says nothing at all to this effect.4 Instead,
Congress left the task of construing the Sherman Act’s vague mandate in
the hands of the courts, forcing them to determine what conduct is
prohibited under the Act on a case-by-case basis.5 While the judiciary has

*B.A., University of Missouri, 2017; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2023; Editor-in-Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2022–2023; Associate Member,
Missouri Law Review, 2021–2022. I am grateful to Professor Thom Lambert, Wall
Family Chair in Corporate Law and Governance, for his insight, guidance, and support
during the writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the
editing process.
1
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY 104
(2016).
2
Nat’l Soc'y of Pro. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
3
15 U.S.C. § 1.
4
See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7.
5
Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Laws. as Amicus Curiae at 8–9, Sanchez
v. United States, No. 19-288 (U.S. Oct. 24, 2019) (citing EARL W. KINTNER, 1 THE
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made significant headway in defining the contours of unlawful behavior
in consumer markets over the past century, a dearth of precedent
concerning the labor market has left employers with little to no notice as
to what may constitute illegal behavior in the labor market.6
Despite this gap, antitrust policing of labor markets has continued to
increase substantially in recent years, with particular scrutiny of
agreements between employers not to recruit or solicit one another’s
employees – often called no-poach agreements.7 Although these
agreements have been the subject of debate in recent years, the U.S.
Antitrust Agencies, which include the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), first
issued formal Guidance in 2016 indicating that DOJ would criminally
prosecute no-poach agreements.8 Until that point, the agencies focused
only on civil enforcement, and courts therefore analyzed challenged nopoach restraints under the rule of reason.9 The new Guidance has led to
reinvigorated agency investigations and settlements, new waves of private
litigation, and, just in the past year, criminal indictments.10
This Note explores DOJ’s increasingly aggressive criminal
enforcement of no-poach agreements in labor markets and the pressing
uncertainty regarding how courts will analyze such agreements. Part II
explains the development of an analytical framework for antitrust
violations in labor markets. Part III describes the Antitrust Agencies’ 2016
Guidance and DOJ’s subsequent efforts to prosecute no-poach agreements
as per se illegal. Thereafter, Part IV discusses the absence of the notice or
judicial precedent required to substantiate criminal prosecutions of nopoach agreements under antitrust law, and DOJ’s failure to acknowledge
the procompetitive benefits of no-poach agreements.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Since the passage of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court of the
United States has recognized that Sherman Act cases are far too complex
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 97
(1978)) [hereinafter Sanchez, Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Laws. as Amicus
Curiae].
6
See Suresh Naidu et al., Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132
HARV. L. REV. 536, 540 n.10 (2018).
7
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ANTITRUST DIV. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS 3 (Oct. 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/download [https://perma.cc/R8EH-A6M5].
8
Id.
9
Eric S. Hochstadt & Nicholas J. Pappas, Restrictions on Employee Change of
Jobs: Antitrust Challenges to “Non-Compete” and “No-Poach” Clauses, 34 ABA J.
OF LAB. & EMP. L. 253, 254 (2020).
10
See infra, Part III.
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for the judiciary to resolve with strict adherence to a literal reading of the
statute’s text.11 Early on, the judiciary rejected a plain reading of the
statute’s language when courts reasoned that because every contract
restrains trade to some extent, not every conceivable contract or
combination is prohibited by the Act – only those that unreasonably
restrain trade.12 The Act, however, provides little direction beyond this.
Courts recognized that without parameters, corporations and individuals
would be left with little guidance in predicting what constitutes legal and
illegal action under the Sherman Act.13 As such, the judiciary has spent
more than a century attempting to assess liability in individual cases
through the application of common law standards.14

A. Developing an Analytical Framework
Courts generally assess potentially anticompetitive conduct under
one of two standards.15 The primary mode for determining the
reasonableness of a restraint is the rule-of-reason analysis.16 Under the
rule of reason, a court looks at various factors – including the history of
the challenged restraint – and then weighs the procompetitive
justifications against the anticompetitive effects of the business practice in
the relevant economic and geographic market.17 Most critically, there is
no presumption of unreasonableness.18 The plaintiff bears the burden of
showing anticompetitive harms, after which the defendant may show offsetting procompetitive benefits.19

11
Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 49, 51 (2007) (“[A]ntitrust cases are too complex and socially important
to turn on simplistic legal commands.”).
12
See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60–68 (1911) (emphasis
added).
13
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972).
14
See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977);
Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933); see also ROBERT H.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 36 (1978) (“[T]he
Sherman Act [is] not a set of specific rules, still less a body of precedent . . . .”).
15
There is a third standard of review, called the “quick look,” which is an
abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis applied when “the great likelihood of
anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained.” Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S.
756, 770, 779 (1999). The quick look analysis is applicable only in civil enforcement
actions and therefore, it is not discussed further for the purposes of this Note.
16
See Michael A. Carrier, The Four-Step Rule of Reason, 33 ANTITRUST 50, 50
(2019).
17
See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Nat’l Soc'y of
Pro. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687–91 (1978).
18
See Nat’l Soc'y of Pro. Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 690.
19
See id.
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By contrast, the per se rule condemns a business practice as a matter
of law without any further consideration of procompetitive benefits.20 It
assumes an irrebuttable presumption of unreasonableness.21 Defendants
can only proffer procompetitive effects as justification in limited
instances, such as when they can demonstrate that the challenged restraint
is ancillary to any anticompetitive harms.22 Historically, courts have
treated horizontal price-fixing, horizontal market allocations, and other
concerted actions as per se illegal.23 Because the per se rule forecloses
inquiry into the justifications or procompetitive effects of a restraint, the
Supreme Court has strictly limited its application to conduct that is
manifestly anticompetitive and on its face lacks any redeeming virtue.24
For this reason, DOJ only criminally prosecutes conduct considered per se
illegal.25 With the stakes so high, the Court has held that “[i]t is only after
considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts
classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act.”26
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
85, 100 (1984) (citing Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979)).
21
Id.
22
Ancillary restraints are defined as agreements that are ‘reasonably necessary’
to a separate, legitimate, pro-competitive integration. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at
100–03; see also Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 373
F.3d 5, 63 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[R]estraints that are truly ancillary to a larger efficiencygaining enterprise . . . are not normally condemned per se without looking at likely
consequences.”).
23
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 216 (1940) (price
fixing); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 246 (1899) (market
allocation).
24
See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)
(“[P]er se rules are appropriate only for ‘conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive.’”)
(quoting Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977)); Broad.
Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (noting that “certain agreements or practices
are so plainly anticompetitive . . . that they are conclusively presumed illegal without
further examination . . . .”); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)
(“[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use.”).
25
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL
III-12 (5th ed. 2015) (available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/761166/download
[https://perma.cc/RG34-V6GQ]).
26
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972); see also
Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 349 n.19 (1982) (discussing the
“established position that a new per se rule is not justified until the judiciary obtains
considerable rule-of-reason experience with the particular type of restraint
challenged.”); FTC v. Sup. Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 432–33 (1990)
(noting that the per se rule “reflect[s] a longstanding judgment that the prohibited
practices by their nature have a substantial potential for impact on competition.”)
(quoting Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984)).
20
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Nevertheless, the practical effect of whether the rule of reason or per
se rule applies has profound implications for the outcome of an
enforcement action.27 In criminal prosecutions, for example, a judicial
finding that a defendant’s conduct should be evaluated under the rule of
reason effectively amounts to a dismissal, whereas a per se rule severely
limits a defendant’s opportunity to defend her actions.28

B. Criminal Liability Under the Sherman Act
The author of the Sherman Act, Ohio Senator John Sherman,
originally intended for the legislation to be a broad remedial statute,
providing that anticompetitive agreements or cartel activity be subject to
private litigation for double damages and civil forfeiture actions by the
government.29 After making its way through various committees in the
House and Senate, however, the law that emerged – ripe with vague,
undefined language – allowed for misdemeanor criminal liability if
violated.30 The bill’s legislative history highlights concerns by various
congressmen who recognized that the courts would need to define the
broad terms of the statute.31 In fact, the author of the House Judiciary
Committee report on the bill admitted that neither he “nor any man could
know just what contracts” will be barred by the law “until the courts
determine.”32
For eighty-four years, the Sherman Act remained a misdemeanor
statute.33 Imprisonment was rare, imposed in less than four percent of
DOJ’s criminal cases, many of which also involved acts of violence.34
There were, however, a few deviations from this norm.35 In 1921, the first
four individuals convicted for engaging in cartel activity reported to
prison.36 The defendants, all building contractors, each received a ten-

27

Todd Fishman, The Rule of Reason as a Bar to Criminal Antitrust
Enforcement, JD SUPRA (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-ruleof-reason-as-a-bar-to-criminal-87406/ [https://perma.cc/W2U9-GQVJ].
28
Id.
29
Sanchez, Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Laws. as Amicus Curiae,
supra note 5, at 2 (citing EARL W. KINTNER, 1 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 97 (1978).
30
Id. at 8–10.
31
Id. at 7–10.
32
Id. at 9.
33
Id. at 10.
34
Id.
35
Gregory J. Werden, Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let the Punishment Fit the
Crime, 5 EUROPEAN COMPETITION J. 19, 20, n.3_(2009).
36
United States v. Alexander & Reid Co., 280 F. 924, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1922);
Werden, supra note 35, at 20 n.3. Though the per se standard had yet to be formally
articulated, the court in McDonough effectively applied the same principles.
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month sentence for their part in a bid-rigging scheme.37 Then, in 1959,
four individuals were each sentenced to ninety days for fixing the prices
of hand tools.38
During this same general period, the Supreme Court first formally
articulated the per se rule in its 1940 decision in United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co.39 The Court in Socony-Vacuum stated that if defendants
were allowed to argue over whether their alleged price-fixing restrained
trade unreasonably, the Sherman Act “would not be the charter of freedom
which its framers intended.”40 The defendants in the case were convicted,
though the harshest punishment given to any individual defendant was a
$1,000 fine.41
The consequences for convicted criminal defendants in Sherman Act
cases have since increased dramatically.42 Reacting to inflation and public
outrage regarding influence-peddling in the Nixon administration,
Congress upgraded the misdemeanor penalty provision to a felony
violation in 1974 and increased the maximum sentence from one year to
three years.43 Fines also increased to $1 million for corporations and
$100,000 for individuals.44 To better align the sentences with other whitecollar crimes and ensure that corporate fines reflected the harm cartels
inflict on the economy,45 in 2004, Congress further increased the criminal
Alexander & Reid Co., 280 F. at 927 (“[T]he court is satisfied that the mere imposition
of a fine as to certain of the more flagrant instances will afford no cure . . . the situation
presented here is of such character that the time has come to put a stop to these criminal
practices . . .”).
37
Werden, supra note 35, at 20 n.3.
38
United States v. McDonough Co., 180 F. Supp. 511, 514 (S.D. Ohio 1959);
Werden, supra note 35, at 20 n.4.
39
See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Sanchez,
Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Laws. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 5, at 11.
While the court first applied what later came to be known as the per se approach in
United States v. Trenton Potteries, the court did not use the language “per se” as it
relates to antitrust matters until Socony-Vacuum. 273 U.S. 392, 396 (1927).
40
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 221; Sanchez, Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n
of Crim. Def. Laws. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 5, at 12.
41
Adjusted for inflation, this would amount to roughly $20,000 in 2022. U.S.
Inflation Calculator, https://www.usinflationcalculator.com [https://perma.cc/D6UHAXNN]; Robert E. Connolly, In the Clash Between the Venerable Per Se Rule and the
Constitution, the Constitution Shall Prevail (in Time), 30 NO. 1 COMPETITION: J.
ANTIRUST, UCL & PRIV. SEC. OF CAL. LAWS. ASS’N 117, 122–23 (2020).
42
Connolly, supra note 41, at 123.
43
Sanchez, Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Laws. as Amicus Curiae,
supra note 5, at 15–19.
44
Id. at 19.
45
Scott D. Hammond, An Overview Of Recent Developments In The Antitrust
Division's Criminal Enforcement Program, U.S. DEP'T. JUST. ANTITRUST DIV. (Jan.
10,
2005),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/overview-recent-developmentsantitrust-divisions-criminal-enforcement-program [https://perma.cc/J84R-S38N].
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penalties to a term of imprisonment of up to 10 years, and fines of $100
million for corporations and $1 million for individuals.46

C. Labor Agreements Subject to Enforcement
Antitrust law was designed to ensure the proper functioning of both
consumer and labor markets.47 In an effort to decrease long-term costs on
the sell-side of the market, employers can exercise market power on the
labor side – or buy-side – by implementing various types of agreements,
though doing so may trigger antitrust violations. 48 Explicit wage-setting
agreements with competitors and joint decisions allocating workers,49 for
example, decrease costs directly.50 Other actions, such as no-poach
agreements,51 data exchanges,52 or employer agreements regarding each
other's non-competes, lower costs more indirectly by preventing workers
from resigning in favor of higher paying jobs.53 While some types of labor
market agreements, like explicit wage-fixing, have always been
condemned as unlawful the Antitrust Agencies and the courts have
recently expanded their enforcement efforts.54 The agencies argue that
competition in the labor market provides actual and potential employees
with higher wages, better benefits, and more varied types of employment
– all of which they claim ultimately benefit consumers because a more

Sanchez, Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Laws. as Amicus Curiae,
supra note 5, at 19–20.
47
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?,
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583, 628–36 (2018) (describing the antitrust law’s
application to labor market monopsonies).
48
See George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 807, 812–
13 (1991).
49
Wage-fixing agreements are arrangements whereby companies agree to
constrain “employees' salary or other terms of compensation, either at a specific level
or within a range.” No More No-Poach: The Antitrust Division Continues to
Investigate and Prosecute “No-Poach” and Wage-Fixing Agreements, U.S. DEP'T
JUST. ANTITRUST DIV. (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/divisionoperations/division-update-spring-2018/antitrust-division-continues-investigate-andprosecute-no-poach-and-wage-fixing-agreements [https://perma.cc/GBQ2-S9VH].
50
See, e.g., Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600, 606–07 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
see also Anderson v. Shipowners' Ass'n of Pac. Coast, 272 U.S. 359, 364–65 (1926).
51
No-poach agreements, also referred to as “anti-solicitation,” “no-hire,” “noswitching,” or “no cold call” agreements, are arrangements whereby companies agree
not to compete for each other's employees by not soliciting or hiring them. No More
No-Poach, supra note 49.
52
See Todd v. Exxon, 275 F.3d 191, 203 (2d Cir. 2001).
53
See In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110–12
(N.D. Cal. 2012).
54
ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS, supra note 7.
46
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competitive workforce may lead to greater quality and quantities of goods
and services.55
Antitrust scrutiny of no-poach and other types of agreements in the
employment context is nothing new,56 though the persistent focus over the
years on consumer output markets has led to a lack of precedent relating
to labor input markets.57 This has created uncertainty among the courts as
to what analytical framework should apply in challenges to such
restraints.58 The uncertainty is heightened by the different factual
scenarios that arise in labor-related cases, which presumably make courts
reluctant to use a straightforward application of a standard.59 Courts
appear more comfortable applying a per se standard in wage-fixing
cases,60 though this is likely because no-poach agreements are more often
deemed to be ancillary to a procompetitive purpose, whereas wage-fixing
is more directly analogous to price-fixing on the sell-side.61
The term “no-poach” first came into the antitrust spotlight in 2010
when DOJ filed a complaint against several Silicon Valley technology
firms challenging their use of no-poach and wage-fixing agreements.62
Id.; see also In re Papa John’s Emp. & Franchisee Emp. Antitrust Litig., No.
3:18-CV-825, 2019 WL 5386484, at *9 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 21, 2019) (“Plaintiffs also
sufficiently plead antitrust injury. Plaintiffs contend that the no-hire provision is an
agreement not to compete for labor and that the agreement had the purpose and effect
of depressing wages and diminishing employment opportunities.”).
56
See, e.g., Anderson v. Shipowners' Ass'n of Pac. Coast, 272 U.S. 359, 364–65
(1926) (shipowners violated Sherman Act by agreeing to have hiring and wage
decisions set collectively through a complex registration scheme); Cordova v. Bache
& Co., 321 F. Supp. 600, 606–07 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (brokerage firms violated antitrust
law by collectively agreeing to reduced commissions for employee brokers).
57
See Naidu et al., supra note 6.
58
See, e.g., Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652, 656–57 (2d Cir. 1957)
(finding that “no-switching” agreements were not inherently anticompetitive because
they are “directed at the regulation of hiring practices and the supervision of employee
conduct, not at the control of manufacturing”).
59
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886–87
(2007) (holding that per se standards should rarely be expanded).
60
Compare Todd v. Exxon, 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (“If plaintiff . . .
could allege that defendants actually formed an agreement to fix MPT salaries [the]
per se rule would likely apply.”), with Nichols v. Spencer, 371 F.2d 332, 335–36 (7th
Cir. 1967) (finding that the injury caused by a no-poach agreement must be shown
through output markets effects).
61
See Eichorn v. AT&T, 248 F.3d 131, 145 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding a limited nopoach agreement was ancillary to a procompetitive merger).
62
Companies involved include Adobe, Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, and Pixar.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Just. Antitrust Div., Justice Department Requires Six
High Tech Companies to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation
Agreements (Sept. 24, 2010) (available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-requires-six-high-tech-companies-stop-entering-anticompetitiveemployee [https://perma.cc/V4RM-KNPB]).
55
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The civil complaint alleged that the companies entered explicit agreements
to refrain from soliciting highly skilled employees from each other's
companies.63 Because customer non-solicitation agreements are a
recognized form of market allocation in output markets,64 DOJ advanced
the then-novel argument that no-poach agreements represent the same kind
of behavior, just in an input market.65
A settlement followed in which the defendants entered into consent
decrees enjoining them from participating in the challenged business
practices.66 Following DOJ’s settlement with the defendants, a class
action was filed on behalf of 64,000 of the defendants’ employees, and the
case ultimately settled for $415 million. 67 Because both cases settled, the
court never reached the issue of whether a rule of reason or per se analysis
would apply to the no-poach agreements in question.68
Soon after the Silicon Valley cases, DOJ filed a similar complaint
concerning no-poach agreements against eBay in November 2012.69 The
defendants moved for dismissal, arguing that under the rule of reason,
DOJ’s complaint failed to properly allege an unreasonable restraint of
trade.70 The trial court noted that the agreement constituted a horizontal
market allocation agreement, which is generally a per se violation, because
“[a]ntitrust law does not treat employment markets differently from other
markets in this respect.”71 Nevertheless, in denying the motion to dismiss,
the judge held that the court need not reach the question of the appropriate
analytical standard at the pleading stage.72 Soon thereafter, eBay settled
with DOJ in an agreement that enjoined the company from entering into

63

Competitive Impact Statement by United States at 2–5, United States v. Adobe
Syss., Inc. et al., No. 1:10-cv-1629, 2011 WL 10883994 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2010).
64
See United States v. Cooperative Theaters of Ohio, 845 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th
Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Brown, 936 F.2d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A
market allocation agreement between two companies at the same market level is a
classic per se antitrust violation.”).
65
Adobe Syss., Inc. Competitive Impact Statement by United States, supra note
63, at 7–9.
66
See Adobe Syss., Inc., 2011 WL 10883994, at *2.
67
Melissa Lipman, Judge Koh OKs $415M Google, Apple Anti-Poaching Deal,
LAW360
(Sept.
3,
2015)
(subscription
required),
https://www.law360.com/cases/4e3fb5601d1d2e4449000001/articles
[https://perma.cc/5ZEJ-LZSB].
68
See In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103,
1112 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (granting in part and denying in part defendants’ joint motion
to dismiss).
69
See generally United States v. eBay, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1032 (N.D.
Cal. 2013).
70
Id. at 1034.
71
Id. at 1039.
72
Id. at 1040.
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any future no-poach arrangements.73 Once again, as the court did not rule
based on a full evidentiary record, this action did little to provide clarity
as to the proper standard of review for no-poach agreements.74

III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The impact of these no-poach agreements and the litigation that
followed did not end there. Together with the FTC, DOJ decided that
greater enforcement of antitrust laws in labor markets was necessary to
protect employees, and that enforcement began with the Antitrust
Guidance issued in 2016.75

A. Introducing Criminal Liability for No-Poach Agreements
In October 2016, DOJ and the FTC jointly issued “Antitrust
Guidance for Human Resource Professionals” with the goal of providing
a roadmap to corporations on the application of federal antitrust laws
regarding hiring practices and certain employment agreements.76
Reiterating DOJ’s position from the Silicon Valley cases that an
agreement not to compete for employees’ services is a per se antitrust
violation, the agencies pointedly warned the business community, “Going
forward, the DOJ intends to proceed criminally against naked wage-fixing
or no-poach agreements.”77 The Guidance also noted, however, that if the
agreement is not separate from or is reasonably necessary to a larger
legitimate collaboration between the employers, it would be considered
ancillary, and not per se illegal.78 But it did not provide detailed instruction
on how to evaluate whether the agreement was reasonably necessary and
what might constitute a legitimate collaboration.79
Antitrust practitioners and academics have vigorously debated the
substantive merits of DOJ’s policy shift in the last few years.80 Some

73

See Order Granting Motion to Approve Consent Judgment at 3, eBay, Inc.,
No. 5:12-cv-5869 (N.D. Cal. entered Sept. 2, 2014).
74
Id.
75
See ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS, supra
note 7.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 4.
78
Id. at 3.
79
See id.
80
Compare Jamie Chen, “No-Poach” Agreements as Sherman Act § 1
Violations: How We Got Here and Where We're Going, 28 COMPETITION: J.
ANTITRUST, UCL & PRIV. SECTION CAL. LAWS. ASS’N 82, 93 (2018) with Dina Hoffer
& Elizabeth Prewitt, To Hire or Not to Hire: U.S. Cartel Enforcement Targeting
Employment Practices, 3 CONCURRENCES COMPETITION L.J. 78, 81 (Sept. 2018),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/to-hire-or-not-to-hire-us-cartel-enforcement-
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commentators argue that the Guidance brings antitrust jurisprudence “full
circle” to the precedent set forth a century prior by extending the same
level of antitrust protection to individuals and employees as to products.81
Conversely, the abrupt policy change has also received criticism where
these agreements may offer some procompetitive effects such that outright
condemnation as per se anticompetitive is “precipitous and
inappropriate.”82 Regardless, DOJ has used its enforcement powers to
bring cases against firms that use no-poach and related restraints to inhibit
worker mobility and pay, yet several questions remain about government
enforcement policies in this area.

B. Post-Guidance Enforcement
In the first four years following the Antitrust Guidance, DOJ did not
formally bring any criminal prosecutions related to no-poach agreements.
Instead, DOJ brought civil enforcement actions and intervened in private
lawsuits relating to no-poach agreements.83
For example, in April 2018, the Government brought its first postGuidance civil enforcement action against two leading firms in the railroad
equipment industry for allegedly agreeing not to hire each other’s
employees.84 Within the rail industry, DOJ observed a high demand for –
yet limited supply of – skilled employees.85 Moreover, the agency found
that the no-poach agreements restrained competition to recruit workers by
limiting employee mobility and depriving employees of competitive
information they could have used to negotiate for better terms of
employment.86
In its competitive impact statement,87 DOJ echoed its position that
no-poach agreements unlawfully allocate employees between the
targeting-employment-practices
[https://perma.cc/QGN7-US4H]
(subscription
required).
81
See Anderson v. Shipowners' Ass'n of Pac. Coast, 272 U.S. 359 (1926); Jamie
Chen, “No-Poach” Agreements as Sherman Act § 1 Violations: How We Got Here
and Where We're Going, 28 COMPETITION: J. ANTITRUST, UCL & PRIV. SECTION CAL.
LAWS. ASS’N 82, 93 (2018).
82
See Hoffer & Prewitt, supra note 80.
83
See, e.g., Complaint at 1, United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG, No. 1:18-cv747, 2018 WL 4386565 (D.D.C. July 11, 2018); Statement of Interest of the United
States, In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust Litig., No. 2:18-MC-798-JFC (W.D.
Pa. Feb. 8, 2019); Statement of Interest of the United States, Seaman v. Duke Univ.,
No. 1:15-cv-462, 2019 WL 4674758 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2019).
84
Complaint at 1, United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG, No. 1:18-cv-747, 2018
WL 4386565 (D.D.C. July 11, 2018).
85
Id. at 5.
86
Id. at 10–11.
87
A competitive impact statement is a document filed by the government which
provides analysis on the potential effects that an agreement will likely have on
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companies and thus are indistinguishable from market allocation
agreements, which are per se unlawful restraints of trade that violate
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.88 However, DOJ reached a settlement in
the case rather than pursue a criminal investigation.89 The parties
consented to a judgment that enjoined the defendants from engaging in
future no-poach agreements and required them to turn over any evidence
of additional no-poach agreements with other companies.90
DOJ has additionally used statements of interest to intervene in
private enforcement actions involving no-poach agreements.91 For
example, DOJ intervened and filed a statement of interest in subsequent
class actions brought by the employees of the railroad equipment firms,
arguing that the court should apply the rule of per se illegality.92 DOJ cited
multiple decisions, including the Silicon Valley and eBay cases, where
courts denied defendants’ motions to dismiss because plaintiffs plausibly
alleged that no-poach agreements were per se unlawful, even though those
cases were ultimately settled before the courts could articulate specific
rules.93 Up until this point, no court had passed on the correct framework
for analysis. While the court agreed with DOJ and found that the plaintiffs
plausibly alleged that the challenged agreements were naked horizontal
restraints subject to a per se analysis,94 the cases again ultimately settled
before the court had the opportunity to apply the rule.95

competition in the relevant market. See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act
(Tunney Act), Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 2(b).
88
See Competitive Impact Statement at 9, Knorr-Bremse AG, No. 1:18-cv-747,
2018 WL 4386565 (“Market allocation agreements cannot be distinguished from one
another based solely on whether they involve input or output markets.”).
89
See id. at 12.
90
See Final Judgment at 1–4, Knorr-Bremse AG, No. 1:18-cv-747, 2018 WL
4386565 (describing the agreed-upon terms between the parties).
91
See, e.g., Statement of Interest of the United States, In re Ry. Indus. Emp. NoPoach Antitrust Litig., No. 2:18-MC-798-JFC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2019); Statement of
Interest of the United States, Seaman v. Duke Univ., No. 1:15-cv-462, 2019 WL
4674758 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2019).
92
Statement of Interest of the United States, In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach
Antitrust Litig., No. 2:18-MC-798-JFC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2019).
93
Boris Bershteyn et al., DOJ Wades Deeper into No-Poach Advocacy,
SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Mar. 19, 2019),
https://www.skadden.com/en/insights/publications/2019/03/doj-wades-deeper
[https://perma.cc/6B54-UQHN].
94
In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust Litig., 395 F. Supp. 3d 464, 481
(W.D. Pa. 2019).
95
Matthew Santoni, Wabtec, Knorr Get Initial Nod On $49M In No-Poach
Deals, LAW 360 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1255140/wabtecknorr-get-initial-nod-on-49m-in-no-poach-deals [https://perma.cc/FV7C-JLMS].
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In 2019 DOJ filed another statement of interest in Seaman v. Duke
University,96 in which the plaintiffs alleged that the medical schools of
Duke University and the University of North Carolina (“UNC”) agreed to
a guideline that prohibited lateral moves of faculty between Duke and
UNC.97 DOJ once again emphasized that naked no-poach agreements
should be subject to a per se analysis, and noted that Duke had not
identified any specific collaborations to which the no-poach agreement
could have been ancillary.98 After DOJ’s intervention, the UNC
defendants settled, and in May 2019, Duke agreed to settle for $54.5
million.99 Once more, the court did not reach a determination as to the
appropriate standard.
In April 2020, the Antitrust Agencies issued a joint statement
reaffirming the importance of competition for American workers.100 The
statement warned companies that, particularly in light of the COVID-19
pandemic, the Antitrust Agencies would be “on alert” for “agreements to
suppress or eliminate competition with respect to compensation, benefits,
hours worked, and other terms of employment, as well as the hiring,
soliciting, recruiting, or retention of workers.”101 The agencies also
reminded employers that enforcement officials were prepared to
criminally prosecute firms entering into these agreements.102 Less than a
year later, DOJ made good on that promise.103

C. The Beginning of No-Poach Criminal Indictments
In January 2021, DOJ brought its first criminal action regarding nopoach agreements against Surgical Care Affiliates (“SCA”), an operator

96
See generally Statement of Interest of the United States, Seaman v. Duke
Univ., No. 1:15-cv-462, 2019 WL 4674758 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2019).
97
See id. at 2–4.
98
Id. at 19–22, 28–29.
99
Stephanie K. Mann, Duke University’s $54.5M settlement in alleged no-hire
pact
suit
approved,
WOLTERS
KLUWER
(Sept.
26,
2019),
https://lrus.wolterskluwer.com/news/antitrust-law-daily/duke-university-s-54-5msettlement-in-alleged-no-hire-pact-suit-approved/95795/
[https://perma.cc/7B46B28B].
100
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just. Antitrust Div., Justice Department and
Federal Trade Commission Jointly Issue Statement on COVID-19 and Competition in
U.S.
Labor
Markets
(Apr.
13,
2020)
(available
at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-federal-trade-commissionjointly-issue-statement-covid-19-and [https://perma.cc/K7B5-EH5A]).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
See infra Part III.C.
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of outpatient surgical facilities.104 The indictment alleges that SCA
entered into and engaged in two separate bilateral conspiracies with other
health care companies not to solicit senior-level employees, thereby
suppressing competition for the employees’ services.105 In the first count,
DOJ alleges that over a three-year period, SCA and another Texas-based
company conspired to suppress competition between them by agreeing not
to solicit each other’s senior-level employees.106 In the second count, DOJ
alleges that, beginning at least as early as February 2012 and continuing
until at least as late as July 2017, SCA conspired with a Colorado-based
company to allocate senior-level employees through a similar nonsolicitation agreement.107
DOJ also alleges various ways that SCA enforced its no-poach
agreements, such as by instructing recruiters not to recruit senior-level
employees, requiring senior-level employee applicants to notify their
managers when they were seeking other employment, monitoring
compliance with the no-poach agreements, and refraining from soliciting
each other’s senior-level employees.108 The case is pending in federal
court in Texas with a trial set to begin in January of 2023.109
In March 2021, DOJ announced it had secured a second no-poach
criminal indictment against VDA OC LLC (“VDA”), a health care staffing
company, and its former manager, Ryan Hee, for conspiring with an
unnamed competitor company to allocate employee nurses and to fix those
nurses’ wages.110 According to the indictment, a school district in Nevada
contracted with both VDA and the other private health care staffing
company to provide nurses who work with students requiring specialized
medical care.111 Beginning in or around October 2016, and continuing
until at least July 2017, VDA, Hee and the other staffing company agreed

104
See Indictment at 1–2, United States v. Surgical Care Affiliates, LLC et. al.,
No. 3:21-cr-00011-L (N.D. Tex. filed Jan. 5, 2021) [hereinafter Surgical Care
Affiliates, LLC, Indictment].
105
See id. at 2–10.
106
Id. at 2–3.
107
Id. at 7.
108
Id. at 3–5.
109
See Upcoming Public Hearings in Pending Cases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/upcoming-public-hearings-pending-cases#surgical (last
updated Apr. 19, 2022).
110
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just. Antitrust Div., Health Care Staffing
Company and Executive Indicted for Colluding to Suppress Wages of School Nurses
(Mar. 30, 2021) (available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/health-care-staffingcompany-and-executive-indicted-colluding-suppress-wages-school-nurses
[https://perma.cc/M4HY-95JS]).
111
Indictment at 3, United States v. Hee et al., No. 2:21-cr-00098-RFB-BNW
(D. Nev. filed Mar. 30, 2021) [hereinafter Hee, Indictment].
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not to recruit or hire each other’s nurses assigned to the school district and
to refrain from raising those nurses’ wages.112
The indictment alleges that the parties carried out the no-poach and
wage-fixing conspiracy via conversations and communications between
executives.113 In one email, Hee purportedly stated that VDA would not
recruit any active nurses whereupon an individual from the other company
wrote back, “Agreed on our end as well.”114 The two staffing companies
also allegedly agreed that if a nurse employed by one company sought
employment with the other, the company would notify the employing
company immediately and would not discuss potential employment with
the nurse.115 The case is currently pending in federal court in Nevada, with
a trial set to begin in July 2022.116
Another no-poach indictment came in July 2021 when DOJ brought
charges against DaVita Inc., another health care company, and its former
CEO Kent Thiry, for allegedly participating in the SCA conspiracy noted
above.117 The indictment alleges that SCA and DaVita had an unwritten
“gentlemen’s agreement” not to poach each other’s senior-level
employees.118 Recruitment efforts were allegedly permitted only after the
employee notified her employer of her intent to leave.119 Even where an
employee gave notice, the defendants allegedly declined to interview
candidates, concealing the existence of the agreement and later informing
the current employer about the outreach and response.120 The indictments
further allege that the defendants had a valuable relationship that they did
not wish to jeopardize by competing for senior executives.121
DOJ continued to build momentum in its latest indictment filed in
December 2021 against multiple executives and managers from aerospace
firms accused of enforcing no-poach deals.122 According to the

112

Id. at 4.
Id.
114
Id. at 5.
115
Id.
116
See Upcoming Public Hearings in Pending Cases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/upcoming-public-hearings-pending-cases#surgical (last
updated Apr. 19, 2022).
117
See Indictment at 1–3, United States v. DaVita Inc., No 1:21-cr-00229-RBJ
(D. Colo. filed July 14, 2021) [hereinafter DaVita Inc., Indictment].
118
Id. at 2–4.
119
Id. at 4.
120
Id. at 4–5.
121
Id. at 7.
122
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just. Antitrust Div., Former Aerospace
Outsourcing Executive Charged for Key Role in a Long-Running Antitrust
Conspiracy (Dec. 9, 2021) (available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-ct/pr/formeraerospace-outsourcing-executive-charged-key-role-long-running-antitrustconspiracy [https://perma.cc/UZC6-UHJS]).
113
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indictment, Mahesh Patel, a former director of Pratt & Whitney, allegedly
participated in a long-running conspiracy with managers and executives
of several outsource engineering suppliers to restrict the hiring and
recruiting of engineers and other skilled laborers among their respective
companies.123 Patel allegedly enforced these agreements by confronting
the suppliers and threatening to punish them by taking away access to
projects.124 DOJ’s press release noted, “The conspiracy affected
thousands of engineers and other skilled workers in the aerospace industry
who perform services in the design, manufacturing and servicing of
aircraft components for both commercial and military purposes.”125 The
case is currently pending in federal court in Connecticut.126
These indictments represent the first tests of DOJ’s policy of
criminally prosecuting no-poach agreements, though they are unlikely to
be the last.
As these cases move forward through the judicial system, courts are
starting to grapple with the challenges of applying a century of outputfocused precedent to labor market agreements. In January 2022, a federal
district judge in the DaVita and Thiry case declined to dismiss the
indictment, writing that “[A]s violators use new methods to suppress
competition by allocating the market or fixing prices these new methods
will have to be prosecuted for a first time.”127 The judge said further in
the ruling that “defendants had ample notice that entering a naked
agreement to allocate the market would expose them to criminal liability,
however they did it.”128 The case subsequently went to trial in April 2022.
During the trial, DaVita and Thiry conceded that they had in fact reached
agreements with other health care staffing companies.129 But after
deliberating for two days, a jury found DaVita and Thiry not guilty on all
counts.130 The jury concluded that DOJ failed to meet its burden of

123

Indictment at 4–5, United States v. Patel, No 3:21-cr-00220-VAB (D. Ct.
filed Dec. 15, 2021) [hereinafter Patel, Indictment].
124
Id. at 11.
125
Former Aerospace Outsourcing Executive Charged for Key Role in a LongRunning Antitrust Conspiracy, supra note 122.
126
See generally Patel, No. 3:21-cr-00220-VAB.
127
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss at 10, United States v. DaVita Inc., No
1:21-cr-00229-RBJ (D. Colo. filed Jan. 28, 2022).
128
Id. at 18.
129
Alexandra Keck, et. al, First DOJ Criminal Wage-Fixing and No-Poach
Trials
End
in
Acquittals,
JD
SUPRA
(Apr.
19,
2022),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/first-doj-criminal-wage-fixing-and-no1930361/#6.
130
Verdict, United States v. DaVita Inc., No 1:21-cr-00229-RBJ (D. Colo. filed
Apr. 15, 2022).
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showing that the defendants' agreements allocated a market for employees
that resulted in a stifling of meaningful competition.131

IV. DISCUSSION
The government intends to frame no-poach cases as straightforward
conspiracies between competitors, including allegations about
concealment of agreements and persistent monitoring to verify compliance
among conspirators. But in doing so, the government obscures the fact
that felony criminal charges against no-poach agreements between
employers are unprecedented and thus raise important questions about
how to evaluate these agreements, particularly in light of possible
procompetitive benefits and prior judicial findings.

A. Procompetitive Benefits of No-Poach Agreements
By treating no-poach agreements between employers as per se illegal,
DOJ potentially opens the door to criminal enforcement of conduct that
falls outside the Sherman Act’s intended scope. According to DOJ in the
first criminal indictments announced last year, the only action necessary
to qualify for criminal liability is agreeing not to hire each other’s seniorlevel employees.132 DOJ’s view is that, much like horizontal price-fixing
and bid-rigging, the challenged no-poach conduct is illegal and merits
criminal prosecution regardless of the agreement’s actual or likely
detrimental effects on any competitive markets for labor, and regardless
of whether the agreement may result in procompetitive benefits that
outweigh any such effects.133
DOJ’s position presents serious concerns for potential wrongdoers
who do not seek to lower wages but instead use written employment
agreements to protect legitimate interests already recognized under state
law.134 Companies may seek to protect against the theft of trade secrets in
sensitive industries,135 to collaborate and innovate in order to develop new

131

Keck, et. al, supra note 129.
Surgical Care Affiliates, LLC Indictment, supra note 104; Hee Indictment,
supra note 111; DaVita Inc. Indictment, supra note 117; Patel Indictment, supra note
123.
133
Surgical Care Affiliates, LLC Indictment, supra note 104; Hee Indictment,
supra note 111; DaVita Inc. Indictment, supra note 117; Patel Indictment, supra note
123.
134
Steve Blonder, Protecting Trade Secrets Is Part of Maintaining a Competitive
Edge, BLOOMBERG L. (June 28, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-lawweek/protecting-trade-secrets-is-part-of-maintaining-a-competitive-edge
[https://perma.cc/E5AY-JEDS].
135
Id.
132
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products or services,136 or to end costly and time-consuming litigation
when a key employee takes knowledge and goodwill from a former
employer to that employer’s competitor.137
A no-poach agreement thus lessens the risk that a competitor will
freeride on an employer’s training investments and disrupt employee
longevity by waiting until employees are fully trained and then poaching
the best ones.138 For this reason, courts have held that non-solicitation and
non-compete agreements between employers and their employees are
generally enforceable, and an agreement not to invite a competitor’s
employees to breach those agreements avoids unnecessary and
burdensome litigation over tortious interference with contract and related
theories.139 In fact, courts have upheld reciprocal no-hire agreements
when executed for the purpose of avoiding litigation arising from
violations of the companies’ respective non-compete agreements.140 Some
may argue direct agreements between employers and their employees can
achieve the same benefits in a less restrictive manner while providing
employees with more opportunities to engage in the negotiation of such
provisions.141 But this process is merely a waste of resources because the
agency and transaction costs could be substantially lessened if a firm is
136

Siri Bulusu, Antitrust Regulators Eye Criminal Enforcement in No-Poach
Deals, BLOOMBERG L. (May 17, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-lawand-business/antitrust-regulators-eye-criminal-enforcement-in-no-poach-deals
[https://perma.cc/B385-H6JR].
137
Alex Malyshev & Jeffrey S. Boxer, With DOJ's focus on wage fixing and no
poach agreements, non-compete and antitrust laws collide, REUTERS (Aug. 23, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/with-dojs-focus-wage-fixing-no-poachagreements-non-compete-antitrust-laws-2021-08-23/ [].
138
Benjamin R. Dryden & Elizabeth A. N. Haas, Antitrust Scrutiny of NoPoaching Agreements Continues to Pick Up Steam, FOLEY LAB. & EMP. L. PERSPS.
BLOG
(Sept.
24,
2018),
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2018/09/antitrust-scrutiny-ofnopoaching-agreements-contin [https://perma.cc/BMA2-74FU].
139
Teresa Lewi et al., Recent Federal and State Laws Restrict Use of Employee
Non-Competition Agreements by Government Contractors and Other Employers,
COVINGTON:
INSIDE
GOV’T
CONTS.
(Aug.
19,
2021),
https://www.insidegovernmentcontracts.com/2021/08/recent-federal-and-state-lawsrestrict-use-of-employee-non-competition-agreements-by-government-contractorsand-other-employers/ [https://perma.cc/M8S5-SC38].
140
See, e.g., Hangar v. Berkley Grp., Inc., 2015 WL 3439255, at *7 (W.D. Va.
May 28, 2015); cf. Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1983)
(analyzing noninterference agreement and recognizing interest in “preserving trade
secrets and protecting investments in personnel”).
141
See, e.g., Russell Cawyer, Competitors Beware – No-Hire Agreements May
Draw Unwanted Attention from the Feds, KELLY HART (Jan. 5, 2011),
https://www.texasemploymentlawupdate.com/2011/01/articles/noncompetes-andrestrictive-covenants/competitors-beware-no-hire-agreements-may-draw-unwantedattention-from-the-feds/ [https://perma.cc/4MSQ-JN77].
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required to oversee and enforce only one agreement with its competitor,
rather than hundreds of agreements with each individual employee.142
Because courts have found some circumstances in which no-poach
and other related agreements are permissible, it follows that these
agreements cannot be per se illegal without further evaluation and
adjudication.143 After all, “[t]he per se rule is based on the premise that
particular restraints are unreasonable as a class.”144 DOJ’s stated position
that no-poach agreements are per se illegal leaves concerningly little room
for arguments that such agreements protect vital procompetitive business
interests because even if a defendant can introduce evidence that it is
ancillary, there is a strong presumption against it from the outset. Thus,
given the trend of criminal indictments, DOJ should proceed with caution
to properly determine which restraints are indeed ancillary and which are
naked so as to not suppress what may otherwise be beneficial agreements.
The recent jury verdict in the DaVita case may signal additional
complications for DOJ as well.145 Even in a case with arguably bad facts
and a blatant agreement not to hire one another’s employees – an
agreement that likely qualifies as naked – the jury still found that DOJ
failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the agreement resulted in
any real harm to competition.146 Not only does DOJ need to be mindful of
underlying procompetitive benefits, but they must also now reevaluate
how truly anticompetitive no-poach agreements are to the labor market,
and whether these effects should warrant a possible ten years in prison.147

B. Circumventing Notice and Precedent
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits enforcement
of a criminal statute that “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or
encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”148 To make the
warning fair, the line establishing criminal conduct “should be clear.”149
Fair notice typically comes from the criminal statute itself.150 But unlike
142

Lewi, et. al, supra note 139.
See, e.g., Aydin, 718 F.2d at 900.
144
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 1910b (4th
ed. 2020).
145
Keck, et. al, supra note 129.
146
Id.
147
See Sanchez, Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Laws. as Amicus Curiae,
supra note 5, at 19–20.
148
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).
149
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (quoting McBoyle v. United
States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)).
150
See F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (“A
conviction or punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute or regulation
143

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

19

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 2 [], Art. 9

610

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

most traditional criminal statutes, the Sherman Act does not clearly
identify the conduct it proscribes.151 Instead, courts have expounded on
the imprecise language of the Sherman Act through common-law
adjudication to determine which conduct falls within the Sherman Act’s
ambit.152
Consequently, litigants must necessarily rely on courts to provide
notice of which conduct is subject to criminal prosecution under the
Sherman Act. But, because courts applying the rule of reason address
individual restraints after the fact based on a complicated and case-specific
economic record, it is difficult “to tell in advance whether projected
actions will run afoul of the Sherman Act’s criminal strictures.”153 Courts
thus provide adequate advance notice for criminal purposes only when
they first declare certain conduct to be per se illegal in civil actions
regardless of the factual record or economic effects in any given case.154
Of course, whether the Supreme Court will ultimately interpret the
Sherman Act such that no-poach agreements fall within the scope of its
criminal prohibitions is unclear. An added difficulty comes into play when
considering the Supreme Court’s prior history of creating and
subsequently dismantling the per se rule for other types of agreements –
all in accordance with what it believes to be the sound economic principles
of the day.155 For example, the Court originally found that resale price
maintenance agreements between manufacturers and distributors were per
se illegal,156 and thus DOJ criminally prosecuted them as such.157 And yet
under which it is obtained ‘fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
of what is prohibited . . . .’” (quoting Williams, 553 U.S. at 304); Rabe v. Washington,
405 U.S. 313, 315 (1972) (per curiam) (“To avoid the constitutional vice of vagueness,
it is necessary, at a minimum, that a statute give fair notice that certain conduct is
proscribed.”).
151
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978).
152
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899
(2007) (“From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law
statute.”); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 98 n.42 (1981)
(“In antitrust, the federal courts enjoy more flexibility and act more as common-law
courts than in other areas governed by federal statute.”).
153
U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 439.
154
Cf. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 n.10 (1972);
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 551 U.S. at 917 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Are
there special advantages to a bright-line rule? Without such a rule, it is often unfair . .
. for enforcement officials to bring criminal proceedings.”).
155
Connolly, supra note 41, at 126 (discussing how over its history, the Supreme
Court has created, and later repealed, per se rules for vertical price fixing, maximum
resale price maintenance, vertical non-price restraints, boycotts and tying).
156
See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 405
(1911).
157
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 665 F.2d 24, 29–
30 (2d Cir. 1981).
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nearly one hundred years later the Court reversed its position, finding the
rule of reason analysis more appropriate given the well-recognized
procompetitive benefits created by vertical price agreements.158 The
nature of modern-day commerce and the lack of any substantive legislative
updates call into question whether the Act sufficiently informs potential
defendants of the conduct that could subject them to criminal
punishment.159 No-poach agreements were not always considered an
inherently unreasonable restraint of trade,160 and once they were, they were
still only enforced by civil remedies until the 2016 Antitrust Guidance
declared that they warranted criminal sanctions.161 And who is to say that
no-poach agreements will not someday fall into the same category as
vertical price agreements, subject once again to a rule of reason analysis
based simply upon the whims of the courts or the White House. After all,
President Biden’s labor agenda is a core driver of this priority.162 The next
president could dismantle it through non-enforcement at DOJ, and people
should not be expected to follow this inconsistency, especially when
criminal liability is at stake.
Whether a non-binding Guidance document constitutes sufficient
notice that no-poach agreements are a crime at all is highly debatable. But
regardless, when courts first criminally prosecuted individuals for other
antitrust offenses, the penalties were much less severe and rarely
enforced.163 Now armed with harsher penalties,164 it should follow that the
agencies, courts, and legislature be required to adhere to greater notice
standards as well. Without judicial intervention, it seems inappropriate for
the executive branch to unilaterally define what conduct gives rise to
criminal liability.165 For this reason, interpretative documents like the
Antitrust Guidance have fashioned unlegislated crimes, signaling that the
Act may not provide fair notice.166 And even if a court does someday find

158

Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 551 U.S. at 886–87; see also Howard
P. Marvel, The Resale Price Maintenance Controversy: Beyond the Conventional
Wisdom, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 59, 59–62 (1994).
159
Robert E. Connolly, The Sherman Act is Unconstitutional as a Criminal
Statute:
(Part
1),
CARTEL
CAPERS
(July
6,
2017),
http://cartelcapers.com/blog/sherman-act-unconstitutional-criminal-statute-part1/#_ftnref [https://perma.cc/342D-RK2S].
160
ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS, supra note 7.
161
Id.
162
See generally Promoting Competition in the American Economy, Exec.
Order No. 14036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36987 (July 9, 2021).
163
See supra Part II-B.
164
See supra Part II-B.
165
ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS, supra note 7.
166
Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus
Curiae at 8–13, United States v. DaVita, Inc., No. 1:21-cr-00229 (D. Colo. filed July
14, 2021).
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such agreements are illegal, it cannot happen for the first time in a criminal
case without violating due process.167
From the time enforcers brought the first federal civil no-poach cases
in 2010,168 antitrust practitioners have learned surprisingly little about the
boundaries of labor market claims from civil lawsuits. In fact, most civil
cases addressing no-poach agreements are dismissed,169 settled after
surviving a motion to dismiss,170 or dismantled when the court declines to
certify a class of plaintiffs to pursue the case.171 This is not uncommon
among antitrust cases in general, but given that nearly 100 antitrust cases
relating to no-poach agreements have been filed against various employers
since 2012,172 it is startling that more law has not developed on the topic.
As a result, the limited category of per se offenses cannot be
expanded unilaterally by the antitrust enforcement agencies and applied
for the first time in the context of a criminal prosecution without raising
overwhelming due process hurdles.173 To be sure, DOJ and the FTC share
concurrent responsibility for enforcing antitrust laws.174 Those agencies’
methods, priorities, experience, and guidance are all important tools that
help consumers, companies, and courts develop their view of the scope of
antitrust laws.175 Indeed, the Antitrust Division’s own manual states that
“[t]here are a number of situations where, although the conduct may
appear to be a per se violation of law, criminal investigation or prosecution
may not be appropriate.”176 These situations include cases where: (1) the
case law is unsettled or uncertain; (2) there are novel issues of law or fact
presented; (3) confusion reasonably may have been caused by past
prosecutorial decisions; or (4) there is clear evidence that the subjects of
167

Id.
Justice Department Requires Six High Tech Companies to Stop Entering into
Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation Agreements, supra note 62.
169
See, e.g., Fonseca v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 19-cv-1748, 2020, WL
4596758 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2020), aff'd, No. 20-56161, 2021 WL 4796540 (9th Cir.
Oct. 14, 2021).
170
See, e.g., In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust Litig., 395 F. Supp. 3d
464, 481 (W.D. Pa. 2019); Seaman v. Duke Univ., No. 1:15-cv-462, 2019 WL
4674758 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 25, 2019).
171
See, e.g., Weisfeld v. Sun Chem. Corp., 84 F. App’x 257 (3d Cir. 2004).
172
BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/search/results/4e39f79e05b1711adae5
ee70269208c4/?utm_source =ANT&utm_medium=ANP [https://perma.cc/96UUW863] (last visited Jan. 19, 2022) (search in search bar under all U.S. District Court
Dockets [agree! AND employee! /s (no-poach OR no-hire], filing type
complaint/petition, nature of suit antitrust).
173
Brief for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae at 5, United
States v. Surgical Care Affiliates, No. 3:21-cr-00011 (N.D. Tex. filed Jan. 5, 2021).
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 25.
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the investigation were not aware of, or did not appreciate, the
consequences of their action.177
Unlike well-adjudicated offenses on the sell-side of the market such
as price-fixing, bid-rigging, and market allocation, no-poach agreements
on the buy-side of the market have not undergone sufficient development
in civil cases to warrant an outright classification as per se offenses. The
long and careful judicial experience needed to determine that such
agreements are inherently anticompetitive does not exist. 178 Judicial
experience with no-poach agreements in the civil context is limited and
has taught precisely the opposite: no-poach agreements can have
procompetitive effects, and the parties to these agreements rarely have true
market power over employees.179

V. CONCLUSION
No-poach agreements can harm competition among employers for labor
and consequently result in lower wages or benefits for employees and
harm to consumers in the form of reduced output or less innovation.180 But
at the same time, no-poach agreements have the procompetitive benefit of
ensuring longevity and minimizing volatility in ways that make a company
a better and more vigorous competitor.181 While the FTC and DOJ should
pursue unlawful no-poach agreements using civil enforcement under the
rule of reason, they should do so in a manner that is analytically sound and
consistent with legislative and judicial precedent. Until then, the agencies’
unilateral determination that no-poach agreements are criminal and per se
illegal fails to satisfy these fundamental requirements.
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Id.
See Motion to Dismiss filed by DaVita at 8, United States v. DaVita Inc. et
al., No 1:21-cr-229 (D. Colo. filed July 14, 2021).
179
Motion to Dismiss filed by Surgical Care Affiliates at 8, United States v.
Surgical Care Affiliates, No. 3:21-cr-00011 (N.D. Tex. filed Jan. 5, 2021).
180
See supra Part II-C.
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Motion to Dismiss filed by Surgical Care Affiliates, supra note 179, at 13.
178

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

23

